The imperatives of change were equally evident in our Pacific partnership with Japan.

The relaxation of tensions with the Communist world was generating new doctrines of defense and diplomacy. The economic revival of Europe was straining the Atlantic monetary and commercial framework. European unity which we had always encouraged, was raising new issues in Atlantic relations. But by the time this Administration took office, the tide was flowing toward greater economic and political assertiveness by our allies. We provided much of the leadership and planning for common defense. Throughout the postwar period our bonds with Europe had rested on American prescriptions as well as resources. Fueled by our assistance and secure behind our military shield, they regained their economic vigor and political confidence. After the devastation of the Second World War we had helped allies and former adversaries alike. Our principal alliances with Western Europe and Japan needed adjustment. There could not be a stable world order with a major power remaining outside and hostile to it. China's isolation compounded its own sense of insecurity. We could not effectively reduce tensions in Asia without talking to Peking. The gulf between China and the world distorted the international landscape. China in turn was emerging from its isolation and might be more receptive to overtures from foreign countries. But this process could not be truly effective so long as we were cut off from one-quarter of the globe's people. In the 1960's the forces of nationalism dissolved Communist unity into divergent centers of power and doctrine, and our foreign policy began to differentiate among the Communist capitals. For years our guiding principle was containment of what we considered a monolithic challenge.

The People's Republic of China was separated not only from us but essentially from the world as a whole.Ĭhina also exemplified the great changes that had occurred in the Communist world. Here the problem was not one of a fluctuating relationship but rather of having no relationship at all. In any event, this Administration inherited two decades of mutual estrangement and hostility. This was due partly to its own attitude and its preoccupation with internal problems, and partly to the policies of the outside world, most importantly the United States. The weight of China rested outside the international framework. And our two countries not only risked collision but were constrained from working positively on common problems.

This in turn exacerbated local and regional tensions. The threat of a major conflict between us hung over the world. The basic pattern was a tense jockeying for tactical advantage around the globe. Improvements in the climate were quickly replaced by confrontation and, occasionally, crisis. Accords were reached on particular questions, but there was no broad momentum in our relationship. There were positive interludes, but these were often atmospheric and did not get at the roots of tension. We each led and dominated a coalition of opposing states.Īs a result, our relationship was generally hostile. We both had global interests, and this produced many friction points. We alone had the capacity to wreak catastrophic damage across the planet. Our growing nuclear arsenals were largely directed at each other. Throughout the nuclear age both the fears of war and hopes for peace revolved around our relations with the Soviet Union. The international environment was dominated by seemingly intractable confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. It was rather that new conditions, many of them achievements of our policies, summoned new perspectives. It was not a question of our previous policies having failed indeed, in many areas they had been very successful. After a generation, the postwar world had been transformed and demanded a fresh approach. Whoever took office four years ago would have faced this challenge. In January 1969, America needed to change the philosophy and practice of its foreign policy.

Alliances observing the deadlock